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Abstract 
This article examines a contemporary antagonism in gendered safety 
discourses—the imperative to be free in public space against the obligation to 
be safe and “properly” feminine. We argue that this produces (and is produced 
by) contemporary rape culture, which might be contested through recourse to 
an agonistic ethic. Using qualitative interview data, we examine how 
participants contest victim-blaming discourses, while limiting how far they will 
accept the female body’s right to occupy public space. This article has 
significant implications for approaching social justice, in particular justice for 
women and their right to occupy public space. 
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Introduction 
Woman is present in cities as temptress, as whore, as fallen woman, as lesbian, but also 
as virtuous woman in danger, as heroic womanhood who triumphs over temptation and 
tribulation. (Wilson, 1991, p. 6) 
 
Jill Meagher was raped and murdered on the streets of Melbourne, Australia, on 
September 21, 2012. A few days later, once her body had been discovered and the 
events of the attack ascertained through the piecing together of Closed Circuit 
Television footage, a Reclaim the Night march took place on the street where 
Meagher’s image was last captured. The case—from Meagher’s disappearance to the 
detainment, trial, and eventual incarceration of her assailant, Adrian Ernest Bayley—
received worldwide  
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media attention and comment. Sasha Chambers, a woman in the crowd outside the court 
when Bayley was sentenced, explained how these events affected her: 
What occurred to Jill, I thought that could happen to anyone . . . I wear flat shoes, I don’t 
wear high heels, I make sure I’m in a group when I’m wearing them. I don’t drink 
alcohol anymore . . . It has impacted my life. (Cited in “May U Rot,” 2013) 
 
These events, and the relationships between them, capture a contemporary 
antagonism concerning women’s bodies in public space that we interrogate in this 
article: the tension between the imperative to be free—to reclaim the night—and the 
obligation to be safe in public spaces. We examine how this tension emerges through 
discourses of personal freedom and personal responsibility. We also situate this 
antagonism within a public sphere of political contestation characterized by an 
agonistic ethic. Within liberal democracies, at least, we suggest that one strategy for 
feminist challenges to the proper constitution of femininity lies in bringing these 
antagonisms into the public political sphere—not for debate, but for a more thorough 
transformation. 
The attack of Jill Meagher confronts us with the actualization of a number of rape 
myths; a violent “stranger-rape” and murder of a woman in a public space, who was 
walking home alone, at night, after drinking some alcohol. We are then confronted by 
a feminist protest march about women’s bodies that proclaims their right to occupy 
public space, to participate in its production, to transform what public space does, and 
to transform power relations therein (Lefebvre, 1996). However, in Chamber’s 
response, above, we are equally confronted by the established tropes and techniques 
of safety that are addressed to women’s bodies in public space (Brooks, 2011; 
Gardner, 1990; Stanko, 1996). These confrontations—as Elizabeth Wilson (1991) 
suggests above—inherit a 19th-century construction of women’s bodies in urban 
public space as a problem without an easy solution. 
In this article, we argue that the problematic body of the woman in public—too 
often discursively framed through idealized figures (the temptress, the whore, the 
virtuous)—is produced through various interlocking dispositifs1 that construct 
appropriate femininity, anxiety about who has the right to occupy public space, and 
contemporary preoccupations with security that become enforced through “sexual 
vigilance.” Sexual vigilance, we argue, is a mode of “active subjectification” that 
organizes how female bodies should appear, occupy, and travel in public spaces 
(Foucault, 1982). The form of sexual vigilance that is produced through these 
interlocking dispositifs is forged through discursive imperatives to be properly 
feminine, to adhere to established gender norms, to protect and safeguard the self and 
constructions of the self. Such sexual vigilance is, we suggest, one way in which the 
problem of the female body in public space is discursively “solved.” The apparent 
antagonisms that accompany discourses about Meagher’s death provide us with a lens 
through which to interrogate the work that this dispositif does and to consider what 
might be possible if this antagonism was to be conceptualized otherwise. As public 
responses to the Meagher murder demonstrate, one of the key ways in which control 
over women’s bodies operates is through the mobilization of the imperative for safety 
and avoidance of risk in public spaces. Here, these imperatives emerge  
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through the production and reproduction of the female body as out of place in public 
space. 
The virgin/whore dichotomy is a well-established and much-critiqued construct 
within contemporary discourses about (in)appropriate femininity (Brownmiller, 1975; 
Smith, 2013). However, the dispositifs that police femininity and that sustain this 
construct are themselves reliant, for their constitution, on the continued proliferation 
of this binary. Within this feedback loop, the female body becomes a site of scrutiny, 
the locus upon which judgments of appropriate femininity are made. In the aftermath 
of Meagher’s rape and murder, much was made of what she was wearing and what 
she was doing prior to her attack. As CCTV film footage of the night of the attack 
demonstrates, Meagher can be seen walking alone on the pavement of a deserted 
street at 1:30 a.m.2 In numerous news articles and online commentary, we are told she 
was on her way home; we are told she had been out drinking. We are also told she was 
married, professionally successful, young, and beautiful. Meagher’s decision to walk 
alone, in high heels, late at night, and after drinking alcohol was strongly scrutinized 
by some members of the public who posted comments about these things on social 
network sites (Ford, 2012; Stockwell, 2012). Through discourses of the ideal victim 
(Christie, 1986; Walklate, 2011), the incident of the rape and murder comes to serve 
as an allegory for other women about the importance of avoiding risk, of staying safe, 
and of taking measures to secure their safety. Yet, both the discourses about how 
women secure their safety in public space and the scrutiny of Meagher’s body and 
performance were also accompanied by counter discourses that pointed to Meagher’s 
“right” to occupy public space at night—to dress and act freely in public. Indeed, the 
decision to hold a protest march on the site of her disappearance was intended to 
contest these victim-blaming discourses and to make claims for women and their right 
to occupy public space. It is the apparent antagonism and oscillation between these 
different positions—and their relation to how sexual vigilance polices women’s 
bodies in public space—that interests us here.  
To examine this, we draw on data collected in qualitative interview material 
acquired through fieldwork at two SlutWalk3 antirape protest marches in the United 
Kingdom in 2011 and 2012. We sought to examine contemporary discourses 
regarding women’s spatial practices, the imperative to avoid risk in public space, and 
the way in which women’s bodies are figured in these discussions. The methodology 
is more comprehensively outlined in a previous discussion of these themes (Lim and 
Fanghanel, 2013). We interviewed 17 women and seven men. Purposive sampling of 
participants in feminist antirape protests was chosen because we are interested in the 
role of feminist claims to the freedom in public space in constituting the antagonism 
with imperatives to secure the self. Interviews took place in pairs or in groups, ranging 
in size from two to 10 people. The data that we cite here were from interviews lasting 
between 30 and 40 min. Interviewees were from a variety of racial and ethnic groups 
and ranged in age from 18 to mid-50s. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
analyzed using an in-depth discourse analysis approach (Hook, 2001; Waitt, 2010). 
Our analysis of these participant discourses extends beyond Boutellier’s (2004) 
theorization of the “safety utopia” by showing how the antagonism between the  
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imperative to be free to occupy public space and the imperative to take responsibility 
for the avoidance of risk in such spaces needs to be understood as produced within the 
dispositif of sexual vigilance. Bringing a Foucaultian perspective to bear, we argue 
that the simultaneous appeals to freedom and to internalized self-control and 
responsibilization are not opposed, but are rather part of the same problem of 
governmentality within a broader apparatus of securitization. Not only does this 
argument have implications for social justice and the right to occupy public space, but 
it also has implications for how the production of appropriate femininities is 
understood as a governmental project. The latter parts of the article borrow from 
Mouffe’s (2000) conceptualization of agonistic pluralism to think about how the 
antagonism between freedom and control relies upon the privatization of questions 
about the production of women’s bodies, practice, and subjectivity. Mouffe’s 
theorization of agonism also allows us to suggest how these questions can be admitted 
into the public sphere of political contestation and struggle—an important strategy for 
challenging the proper constitution of femininity in public space. 
Governmentality and Sexual Vigilance 
Women, as Stanko (1996), Gardner (1990, 1995), and Campbell (2005), among 
others, have rightly noted, are more often than not the target of safekeeping advice 
than men. Although in recent years there has emerged a body of research which 
recognizes that men’s relationships with fear of attack are present and complex, 
female bodies continue to be the locus of intervention for crime prevention advice 
(Day et al., 2003; Moore & Breeze, 2012). In Meagher’s case, walking home alone, 
drinking alcohol, and wearing high heels were all highlighted as careless, risky 
practices. Brooks’s (2011) study of women’s attitudes to safety campaigns which 
target them demonstrates that whether safety advice is accepted or rejected by women, 
it forms part of a practice of subjectification in public spaces. The same might be said 
of the informal proliferation of safety advice. Even when crime-prevention discourses 
are problematized by women—even when they are contested through a Reclaim the 
Night March, or a SlutWalk—they still exert influence on subjectification in their 
negation. Indeed, as Gilchrist, Bannister, Ditton, and Farrall (1998) demonstrate, 
although women are not inherently more fearful of crime in public spaces than are 
men, women’s fear is strongly associated with the performance of appropriate 
femininity. Normative discourses of femininity and masculinity dominate how men 
and women speak about experiences of violence in public spaces (Hollander, 2001; 
Fanghanel, 2015). This work has implications for our own research; after all, the type 
of crime that women are counseled to avoid through safety strategies is violent crime 
and sex crime. We argue that there is a sociocultural investment in producing and 
reproducing these normative gender discourses for these men and women. This finds 
its way into contemporary criminological attitudes to risk management and 
securitization in public spaces (Lee, 2007; Walklate, 1997), and beyond the 
criminological, into more everyday acts of occupying public space (see Scraton & 
Watson, 1998; Thomas, 2004). 
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The auto-policing and acts of governmentality that are implied by these iterations 
of “traditional gender ideology” (Hollander, 2001) reflect a shift in contemporary 
attitudes to understanding crime, crime control, and victimization from a focus on the 
individual deviant criminal toward criminogenic situations that might be tackled 
through risk-averse avoidance strategies (Garland, 1997; O’Malley, 1992). Risk, as 
Douglas (1992) suggests, is calculable and entwined with personal responsibility. 
Foucault (2007) argues that modern states—concerned as they are with managing the 
welfare of populations by analyzing threats to welfare in terms of calculable risks and 
probabilities—develop a series of techniques to make individuals take on this 
responsibility for assessing such risks and probabilities. This individualization of 
responsibility for managing one’s behavior to maximize safety and welfare—and to 
minimize risk—is what Foucault calls “governmentality.” Governmentality becomes 
especially organized around security within what Foucault (2008) understands as 
“neoliberalism,” in which capitalism produces a freedom to consume, enjoy, wander, 
and desire in dispersed spaces—a situation that requires internalized self-control as a 
counterpoint to this freedom (Deleuze, 1992). We argue that one of the ways that this 
governmentality operates is through the imperative toward sexual vigilance and 
avoiding risk. This practice is one of the techniques through which appropriate 
femininity might be constituted and sustained. 
For risk is also a deeply gendered and subjective construct, and its cultural 
relationship to the policing of sexuality and vigilance over preserving appropriate 
femininity should not be underestimated (Lupton, 1999; Walklate, 1997). Here, taking 
risks by walking home alone at night, or drinking too much alcohol, for instance, are 
constructed as contributing to a flawed femininity. As we will discuss later in the 
article, the way in which some women discuss their ambivalent relationships with 
feminine sexuality, public space, and securitization can be understood as a form of 
internalized surveillance of (or vigilance over) the self (Foucault, 1978, pp. 100-102, 
104; Stanko, 1997). This focus on “managing risk” as opposed to “enforcing social 
norms” (Merry, 2001, p. 16) within criminological approaches to dealing with crime 
shifts the focus of safekeeping advice away from perpetrators (who—either as 
“rational criminals” or, as we shall see, “arseholes”—cannot be expected to act 
otherwise) and onto potential victims. The governmentality at play here heightens the 
imperative to care for the self within a strictly risk-averse moral frame, using rape 
myths as allegories against a background of rape culture wherein the objectification of 
women-as-problems and permissiveness of violence against women is condoned and 
encouraged. The price of failing at this care is, as O’Byrne and Holmes (2007) 
suggest, shame and personal guilt. 
Yet, as the responses to Meagher’s murder and as the responses from the 
participants at the SlutWalk marches suggest, the internalization of vigilance over risk 
figured through a constructed association between inappropriate femininity and the 
threat of violence is also antagonistically accompanied by a claim among women to a 
right and freedom to occupy public space. The tension between these positions can 
usefully be brought into a dialogue with Boutellier’s (2004) safety utopia. For 
Boutellier (2004, pp. 4, 8), the “safety utopia” is an impossible desire for a “vital 
society” in which   
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“liberal freedom is to be unreservedly celebrated” but around which boundaries of 
security are tightly set. In other words, Boutellier suggests that—partially through the 
capitalist, neoliberal imperative to self-determine—we exist in a state of perpetual 
(antagonistic) ambivalence, simultaneously desiring both absolute liberty (in a 
classically liberal sense) and the promise of absolute safety. This ambivalence needs 
to be understood as a project of governmentality, we would add. It gives rise to 
anxiety about security in the everyday, and also to the imperative to behave 
responsibly—appropriately—with this freedom. 
Foucault (1984) understands freedom in relation to the care of the self, but the 
latter cannot be understood as only a practice of liberty. Like governmentality, it is 
also an example of a mode of governing the self; the conduct of conduct (Garland, 
1997). Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self is a historical analysis of one 
mode of the broader question of governmentality in which liberty cannot be 
understood as separate from, or opposed to, control and power, but as part of the 
conditions of that power within particular dispositifs. How has this contemporary 
imperative to work on the self—co-opted insidiously by neoliberal politics—
transformed our understanding of the project and practice of freedom? 
Antagonisms of Freedom and Security 
It is not enough simply to suggest that safekeeping practices that target women as 
space users form part of a broader discourse of victim blaming. Feminist attempts to 
contest safekeeping and broader dispositifs of control, self-policing, and vigilance 
often run into the difficulty of how widespread and deep-seated investments in 
appropriate femininity as practiced and embodied through safekeeping seem to be. In 
our research, these difficulties are evident in the way participants negotiated the 
various antagonisms between the imperative to be safe and the right to freedom. 
Again and again, no sooner had a participant critiqued discourses associated with 
“victim blaming,” “rape culture,” appropriate femininity, or safekeeping than they—
or one of their friends—would recapitulate some axiom about the dangers women face 
being by themselves in public space and about women’s responsibilities to keep 
themselves safe by dressing and behaving appropriately. Sometimes, these 
antagonisms were expressed as apparent contradictions in what the participants said, 
whereas at other times, participants attempted to account for the difficulties in 
reconciling their assertions within what discourse analysts (Stapleton, 2001, p. 471) 
call “contrastive structures.” 
This dialogic shuttling between different positions in respect of safety and freedom 
demonstrates the antagonism of the position that women occupy in respect of their 
own sense of self and relationship with, and rights to, public space. We suggest that 
by approaching these dialogic tensions through a theorization of antagonism and 
agonism, we might better interrogate the role that imperatives toward sexual vigilance 
play in public space, and the implications thereof for the project of the self that is 
fostered through safekeeping discourses. We borrow some of our understanding of 
antagonism from Mouffe’s (2000) and Connolly’s (2005) radical democratic 
approaches to thinking about pluralism and the “relation of political adversaries.” The  
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investment of radical democrats such as Mouffe (2000), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 
and Connolly (2005) in the mainstream political institution of democracy may seem at 
odds with the Foucaultian emphasis on critiquing the operation of governmental 
power. However, we demonstrate that Mouffe’s work, in particular, provides rich 
conceptual resources for thinking about how antagonisms are constitutive of who is 
excluded from the space of the public and on what grounds. 
Sexual Desire, Normativity, and the Limit to Freedom 
The antagonistic oscillation between making claims to the right to freely occupy 
public space and the desire for safety evokes the limit of how far the women and men 
to whom we spoke will allow women’s freedom to go. Boutellier (2004, p. 8) makes 
the point that “risk culture” is marked by paradoxical tensions between yearning for 
“expressive uninhibitedness and indignation if it goes wrong, between a high level of 
tolerance and a call for the enforcement of the rules.” We suggest that via the 
discourse of demanding both freedom and safety, the imperative for sexual vigilance 
marks, and is marked by, the appropriate and inappropriate performance of femininity 
and the continued proliferation of rape culture. 
This becomes evident in the way that a movement like the SlutWalk organizes 
itself and the political terrain upon which it operates. SlutWalk describes itself as a 
“worldwide movement against victim-blaming, survivor shaming and rape culture” 
(SlutWalk Toronto, n.d.). “Whatever we wear, wherever we go! Yes means yes and 
no means no!” is the iconic chant that can be heard at this and other antirape protest in 
cities around the world. Such a chant is a direct response to the rape culture, the 
victim-blaming discourses, and the safekeeping advice that targets women’s bodies in 
public space. Making claims both to the freedom to occupy public space (“wherever 
we go”) and the right to dress freely (“whatever we wear”) can be seen as an explicit 
rejection of an imperative to be sexually vigilant that emerges through safekeeping 
discourses. Yet, what also appears here, and what therefore marks the limit to this 
freedom, is the fettered expression of female sexual desire. 
In the statement “yes means yes and no means no!” protesters are clearly 
referencing the problem of consent. But they are also referencing a dynamic more 
subtle than a straightforward affirmation of consent; the feminine response to a 
(presumably, given the heterosexist nature of rape culture and the dominant tone of 
SlutWalk’s politics) masculine question. The answer “yes,” which means yes, and 
“no,” which means no, can only be given in response to a question from a silent 
interlocutor.4 Certainly this emphasizes the importance of women’s right to consent 
(or not) to sexual activity, but it also discursively, intrinsically, places women in the 
position of responder to the question posed by a faceless—amorphous—other. No 
space is afforded to the potentiality of active female sexual desire or autonomy; rather, 
women are always-already passive in this encounter, neither able to initiate sex nor 
preemptively refuse it. Holland et al. (1994) have identified how this reticence to 
express autonomous sexual desire saturates young women’s accounts of their sexual 
practices. They argue that this constructs feminine sexual desire as something that is 
forbidden or taboo. It also   
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complexifies power relations within antirape and antirape culture politics, in part, by 
beginning to cast the discursive limit of freedom under a shadow of normative sexual 
vigilance, so what appears to be a call for emancipation operates instead within an 
economy where women are, in fact, not full actors in a heterosexual sexual encounter. 
It also begins to demonstrate how far men and women to whom we spoke are invested 
in the neoliberalized imperative to care for the self and to be free within a prescription 
of freedom through the operation of compulsory sexual vigilance: 
I think women should obviously be allowed to wear what they want, when they want to 
wear it. But I also think you have a personal responsibility to protect yourself. And not 
putting yourself into situations that could be considered dangerous. Um . . . but yeah, so 
it’s difficult. (Sophie, female, mid- to late 40s, White British, Interview 1, 2011) 
 
Sophie’s use of the auxiliary verb “should” to modify the term “be allowed to 
wear,” here, not only connotes a political territory on which what is at stake is the 
control over—and freedom of—women’s bodies but also shows how such 
antagonisms between political positions are managed. By deferring the effect of 
feminist activism into the future, present investments in particularly validated modes 
of subjectivity—such as appropriate femininity—can be left unexamined, and 
evidence that contradicts the problems with safekeeping messages can be ignored. For 
despite an apparent critique of victim-blaming discourses, Sophie’s reasoning of what 
behavior is appropriate and inappropriate in public space is nonetheless curtailed by 
the expression of patriarchal norms. Who, for instance, gives permission for “women” 
to be “allowed” to dress as they want? Where does this ethic come from? This extract 
also places a neoliberalized emphasis on individualized freedom and responsibility for 
security and risk-avoidance. To be “allowed” to “wear what they want” alongside the 
“personal responsibility to protect yourself” illustrates the antagonism inherent in 
contemporary attitudes to safekeeping. It captures how the neoliberalization of the 
subject forms part of a governmental project of ordering, and gendering, public space: 
What we’ve wanted to come along for today is to say that it’s, it’s about, you should be 
able to wear what you want to wear and you shouldn’t be at risk . . . you should really be 
able to walk down the street naked. It doesn’t mean that you want to be raped. And you 
shouldn’t be judged on what you wear, which is what the policeman was doing. Whereas 
for me I always believe in a little bit of discretion and a little bit of dignity. And . . . I 
don’t see a lot of dignity in a lot of what these people are wearing today. And to be quite 
honest, that is probably all that policeman in Canada was trying to say.5 (Lucy, female, 
late 40s, White British, Interview 1, 2011) 
 
Here, Lucy begins, as other participants in our research did, by articulating the 
imagined message of SlutWalk. She identifies that “it” is about a liberal feminist 
expression of agency and avoidance of risk; the ability (and right) to walk down the 
street—even naked. The second part of Lucy’s statement, however, marks the limits 
of her own investment in the so-called liberatory message of the SlutWalk. Her appeal 
to “discretion” and “dignity,” which are stereotypically feminine characteristics, could 
be said to be   
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particularly indicative of the work that these dispositifs do (see Hollander, 2001). To 
be discreet means, colloquially, to be unobtrusive. Discretion, from the Latin 
discretio, means having the power to make distinctions or the power to make a 
judgment. It also means having the ability to make decisions without causing offense; 
to be careful of other’s sensibilities. Lucy, therefore, expresses a belief that women 
should be able to exercise discretion and control over the self—keeping within bounds 
of (good) judgment as it is delineated by dispositifs of appropriate femininity and of 
safety. Dignity, in contrast, from the Latin dignitatum, meaning “worthiness,” or the 
Old French meaning “honor,” has its root in the Proto-Indo European “dek-,” meaning 
to accept or to be suitable. To behave with dignity, therefore, means not only 
operating within a specific measure of value—worthiness—but also to accept that 
position for oneself. 
It is precisely this imperative to take on board responsibilization discourses that the 
imperative to be sexually vigilant produces. Dignity and discretion are moralistic 
categories (as opposed to ethical practices) and certainly work within a dispositif of 
appropriate femininity. They are, therefore, integrally rooted within a sociocultural 
normativity that mutually composes, and is composed by, rape culture. Indeed, the 
invocation of “nakedness” and running “risks” alongside the imperative for “dignity” 
is suggestive of the undercurrent of shame that is the price of risky practices (Douglas, 
1992; O’Byrne & Holmes, 2007). Lucy argues that women “shouldn’t be judged,” but 
the implication that “judging” may occur in the first place indicates the subordinate 
position of women’s bodies in respect of public space. Such shame thus works to 
mark the limit to freedom that these women’s bodies can expect in public space. 
Given that the espoused purpose of SlutWalk is to critique comments about “dressing 
like sluts” (which is also a moral category), this attempt to find value in Sanguinetti’s 
statement is a huge taking of distance from prevalent SlutWalk discourse, which 
seems to suggest how far investment in these dispositifs produce (certainly this 
participant’s) subjectivity. 
In the quotations from Sophie and Lucy, we can see examples of the ways in which 
the participants often held together antagonistic arguments, asserting that women in 
general should be able to wear what they want in public without being victimized or 
being blamed when they are assaulted, while retaining an investment in appropriate 
femininity (Lucy’s invocation of “dignity”) and the idea that it is women’s 
responsibility to keep themselves safe (Sophie). Participation in feminist activism 
such as SlutWalk that contests the dispositif of sexual vigilance can be understood as 
part of a struggle between imperatives to regulate and secure the self—indeed, to 
desire and to internalize an external control over the self—and imperatives to be self-
determining. Although both sets of imperatives might be taken as “neoliberal,” the 
attempt to elude technologies of control often appeals to a liberal ideal of freedom. 
Yet, rather than understand these antagonisms as a straightforward narrative of 
striving for freedom from control, we understand the appeal to freedom as mutually 
implicated with the imperatives to regulate and secure the self, and to be self-
determining: It is an appeal to the “liberal” in “neoliberal.” As we have discussed 
elsewhere (Lim & Fanghanel, 2013), the appeal to liberalism is fraught with problems 
regarding its fantasies about the subject, the political agent, appropriate femininity, 
and its Others. We do not,   
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however, mean to suggest that any appeal to freedom within feminist activism is 
always-already a project of the privileged. Rather, we argue that the antagonisms 
between, on one hand, safekeeping, regulating the self, appropriate femininity, and 
security, and, on the other hand, a desire to be free from judgment and to be free to 
dress, act, and occupy space as one wants cannot be solved within feminist antirape 
discourses. Rather, what is required is a transformation of the production of female 
bodies, femininity, public space, techniques of safety, assessments of risk, modes of 
governmentality, and constructions of the self: a whole set of dispositifs that feminist 
antirape discourses address. 
Of Arseholes and Lunatics 
Freedom and control are entwined in a complex set of relations of mutuality and 
antagonism. In our research, some of our participants sought not so much to resolve 
contradictions in their assertions by attempting to arrive at a coherent understanding 
with an agreed meaning, but rather to displace the underlying antagonism onto an 
inexplicable figure—the “lunatics” or “arseholes” who commit rape. Such figures 
work within a neoliberal context to position the participants as rational subjects in the 
face of the difficulties they encounter in making sense of the antagonisms between a 
dispositif of sexual vigilance and a feminist critique thereof. They also construct the 
amorphous perpetrator outside of the realm of rationality—a figure who, in a risk-
averse criminological culture, cannot be reasoned with or rehabilitated: 
 
Molly: I think you have got to make the distinction between when a behavior is 
dangerous for the person and when the behavior is not dangerous for anyone else, but 
you make a judgment on it and then . . . you think well why are you making that 
judgment, it’s not hurting anybody, and it’s not, you know it’s not dangerous behavior. 
 
Interviewer: And do you see that the SlutWalk is sort of about that? Sort of about people 
. . . people who’ve dressed up, who are sort of saying that um . . . dressing in a 
provocative way they erm . . . is about them sort of saying, is about them . . . it’s not a 
dangerous behavior in itself . . . 
 
Molly: Yeah, it shouldn’t be. It shouldn’t be. But the perception at the moment is that it 
is. You know, which is why there’s negative . . . 
 
James: Well the comment that started it all off was saying, you know, he [inaudible] in 
order to avoid rape, you need to do this, you need to behave to like that. Which is a 
policeman saying it. 
 
Flora: [Inaudible] I do agree with the idea that, you know, it does exist and . . . whilst you 
shouldn’t have to, you know, protect yourself against it, it is probably a good idea to do it 
because . . . it is harm[ful] at the moment, the attitude is still prevailing. 
 
Interviewer: Yeah. 
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Flora: But . . . it shouldn’t happen. That’s the point. Like you can take steps to stop it 
happening to you, but you shouldn’t have to take steps to stop it happening to you, which 
is . . . 
 
Molly: Like, you know, some of the signs around that are saying that . . . I think as long 
as you are sensible about your behavior, you know that, you don’t drink too much and 
put yourself in a dangerous situation, it shouldn’t matter about the clothes that you wear. 
 
Flora: But then, even drinking too much and putting yourself . . . drinking too much 
shouldn’t be putting yourself in a dangerous situation. Because . . . 
 
Molly: Well no, but I am just saying that . . . 
 
Flora: Yeah it’s, back to, when you are not in control of your . . . of yourself. Then . . . 
you just need to . . . 
 
Molly: It does make you vulnerable. 
 
Flora: Yeah it shouldn’t . . . 
 
Molly: . . . it shouldn’t but . . . 
 
Flora: . . . people are arseholes [laughs]. Yeah, that’s our conclusion. [laughs] That’s my 
motto in life, people are arseholes. (Molly, female, White British; Flora, female, White 
British; and James, male, White British, all early 20s, Interview 3, 2011) 
 
In this extract, Molly starts by discussing the idea of judgments made about 
women’s dress and comportment in public space. The indeterminate “it” of this 
exchange is the act (or threat) of rape or sexual assault. Molly’s utterance situates the 
terms of debate in discourses of risk, security, and danger, and is suggestive of the 
highly moralized technologies of control characteristic of neoliberal governmentality: 
There are always judgments to be made—and to be contested—in relation to the 
purported harm that particular actions would do to the self or to others. Molly situates 
herself in relation to these judgments, arguing that how women dress is not a danger 
to others. This might be taken as an appeal to a liberal political position in which harm 
to others is a permissible ground for outside intervention into the actions of an 
individual, but harm to the self is not. At face value, this appeal to a liberal argument 
might appear to be an attempt to move away from a neoliberal imagination and toward 
a liberal position. However, that would overlook the context in which the appeal to a 
liberal position is made: a questioning of appropriate governmental techniques of the 
self in the dispersed spaces of the city. Our argument here is that liberalism is not in a 
position of exteriority to neoliberalism, for neoliberal modes of governmentality have 
appropriated the imperative to liberty and made it function in a codependent relation 
with modes of control; in other words, the conditions of possibility for an appeal to 
liberalism have been transformed. 
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In the extract above, after James has regrounded the discussion in the context of the 
particular safekeeping message that SlutWalk was established to contest, Flora and 
then Molly partake in a dialogical shuttling between antagonistic political positions. 
Twice Flora suggests that the risks of being raped that are purported within 
safekeeping discourses are real and that there are things that individuals can do to 
protect themselves; and twice she contrasts these statements with the assertion that 
this should not be the case. Molly responds by separating out judgments about 
women’s dress and appearance from judgments about women’s responsibility to 
behave in ways that keep themselves safe from the danger of being assaulted—
aligning herself with the SlutWalk critique in respect of the former, but seeming to 
recuperate safekeeping discourses regarding the latter. Flora rejoins, countering not 
only Molly’s investment in safekeeping but her own from moments before. The two 
sequentially perform a dialogical equivocation, ever more tightly holding together 
antagonistic positions before Flora brings the line of discussion to a close by invoking 
the figure of the “arsehole.” 
In some of the other interviews, similar figures are sometimes invoked. Lucy uses 
the term “lunatics” in such a way, for example. These figures are distinctive because 
they are excessive, beyond rational comprehension of the motivations for action. As 
such, they offer only temporary resolutions in the attempt to resolve this antagonism 
and become allegorical folk devils to absorb the anxiety over the inability to make 
some kind of sense. What they do is to produce merely the semblance of common 
ground. Of course, what these figures also do is to repeat the prominence given to 
stranger rape in popular (and SlutWalk) discourse—a prominence that enables the 
problem of security in public space to become an organizing principle for 
governmental techniques of the female body in public space. The whole problematic 
of judgments concerning appearance and comportment is one that regulates women’s 
presence in public space; the “arsehole,” then, names a relation to the figure of the 
strange and threatening man in public space: 
There are assumptions made and its . . . there is almost an automatic assumption that, you 
know, men are stronger, and yes I fully appreciate that there are men that are raped as 
well, but at the end of the day, it is a much bigger issue for women, you have to be 
careful about where you go at night, you have to be careful about going places on your 
own, you have to think about stuff that most men don’t need to think about. And that’s 
frustrating, and it shouldn’t have to be that way. I accept that, yes, there are things that I 
can do to keep myself safer, but why should I have to, just because there are arseholes 
out there? Who don’t know how to relate to society properly [laughs]? (Karen, female, 
late 40s, White British, Interview 1, 2011) 
Here, Karen repeats imperatives of safekeeping in which the crime of rape is 
understood in terms of women’s responsibility to care for the self. Not only are both 
the nighttime and women’s lone presence in public codified, once again, as dangerous, 
but the imperatives of safekeeping are understood in terms of what we might say is a 
governmental imperative for women to reflect upon one’s own conduct in public 
space in ways that men do not. Even though such a governmental imperative is 
masculinist—indeed, phallocentric—it is women in general who are made to bear its 
burden. Karen  
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then goes on to demonstrate the same kind of shuttling back and forth between 
antagonistic positions that we have witnessed with other participants. First, she alludes 
to a utopian vision that critiques these safekeeping discourses (“it shouldn’t have to be 
that way”); then she expresses her own investment in techniques of safekeeping (“I 
accept that, yes, there are things that I can do to keep myself safer”), before again 
questioning the safekeeping imperative, and ending her turn of talking with an appeal 
to the figure of the “arsehole out there.” 
Again, despite Karen attempting to question the imperative to keep oneself safe, 
her deployment of the figure of the “arsehole” maintains a governmental problematic 
defined in relation to questions of security and danger. More than this, as summoned 
up by both Karen and Flora, the figure of the “arsehole” suggests an individualized 
and inexplicable menace: someone whose motivation cannot be understood, 
unwittingly perhaps resonating with the very discourses that pathologize victims of 
sexual violence such as Jill Meagher. The resort to the abject figure of the “arsehole” 
positions these perpetrators beyond rationality (or rational within their own 
subjective—perverse—reality) and does the same work that pathologizing rape 
victims does. It creates an almost a premodern mythical figuration—a figure without 
an interior life, only surface actions, who is so Other to ourselves that we do not run 
the risk of becoming an “arsehole” or becoming prey to one (Douglas, 1992). Yet, 
here he appears in the midst of the formulation of a modern political settlement. His 
utility lies in the way that he allows the problem of risk to be externalized. The 
“arsehole,” like the “victim,” is a gendered, individual figure, and if it is positioned as 
the source of danger, then it functions to relieve “society” of its position as the level of 
abstraction in which problems of security, safekeeping, danger, and governmentality 
are produced. Being an inexplicable figure, the “arsehole” also fixes the paradox of 
antagonism—or, at least, creates the illusion of being able to explain the inability to 
construct a rational resolution of these antagonisms. 
From Arseholes to Agonisms 
All I am saying is you can put yourself in situations where things are more likely to 
happen to you than maybe to happen to somebody else. Like, if you’ve got all the 
windows open in your house, there’s a chance you are going to get burgled. When you 
leave your car window open, there’s a chance that someone’s going to nick [steal] your 
stereo, so I think it’s about sensible measures. (Sophie, female, mid- to late 40s, White 
British, Interview 1, 2011) 
 
The invocation of the figure of the “arsehole” is only necessary in a context where 
there is an assumption that a rational discursive solution to antagonisms must be 
reached. We might say that the context rests upon a particularly liberal fantasy of 
rationality. As Mouffe (2000) argues, such an idealization of rationality fails in practice 
because either it elides the political act of constituting legitimacy (as in Rawls’s, 1996, 
political liberalism) or it assumes the possibility of a rational dialogical situation (as in 
Habermas, 1995) —an assumption that erases antagonism and that erases any possibility 
for questioning   
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the grounds for debate. In a Foucaultian sense, we might consider that neoliberal 
governmentality attempts to construct all subjects as rational economic actors subject to 
the logics of the market (Foucault, 2008). Indeed, the rape myths, in which women 
dressing in public in ways that expose flesh to others’ view is compared to leaving 
valuables on display in an unlocked car or house, such as those repeated by Sophie 
above, are an attempt to place perpetrators of rape in an economy of utility maximizing 
action. The dismissal of this rape myth as the fallacious act of violence that it is—a 
dismissal performed by several of our other participants—removes one way in which an 
accounting for the rationality of different actors might lead to the resolution of the 
antagonisms surrounding rape, freedom, and safety. If the antagonisms between freedom 
and safety in contemporary governmental discourse around sexual violence cannot be 
resolved rationally, the figure of the “arsehole,” at least, allows the participants to 
position themselves as rational subjects in common as opposed to the inexplicable 
motivations of the “arsehole.” Rationality becomes reproduced, not through the rational 
dialogical resolution of antagonisms, but rather through a differentiation that banishes 
perpetrators from the sphere of the rational. 
What this leaves intact, though, is the very antagonism that the participants struggle 
with—often with considerable critical insight—throughout their discussion: the 
tension between the imperative to be free and the imperative to self-securitization 
(Bauman, 2000). This irreconcilability between the right in principle to the city 
(Lefebvre, 1996) and the desire in fact to be safe (Boutellier, 2004)—this oscillation 
between “you shouldn’t have to, but you have to”—resonates with what Chantal 
Mouffe (2000) has called, in the context of modern democracy, a paradox. 
Many political philosophers have interrogated the apparent conflict in 
contemporary politics between liberal traditions that establish the limit to sovereignty 
in the name of freedom, on one hand, and democratic traditions that act to safeguard 
the collective “will of the people,” on the other (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 3-4, see also 
Connolly, 2004; Habermas, 1995; Laclau, 2005; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Rawls, 
1996). The paradoxical tension between these competing ethics, is, according to 
Mouffe (2000, pp. 5-6), unsatisfactorily “solved” today by the uncontested rise of 
capitalism and the emergence of a hegemonic neoliberal ethic: an ethic that is open to 
plurality within limits but which seeks order, compromise, and a “misguided . . . 
search for a final rational resolution” to political contestations (Mouffe, 2000, p. 93). 
There are several elements to Mouffe’s thinking about such paradoxes that we think 
can be brought into productive conjunction with the largely Foucaultian perspective 
on the governmentality of sexual vigilance that we have deployed so far. Both 
thinkers offer a relational understanding of power as that which constitutes some kind 
of matter—or materiality—of “truth.” More specifically, however, we think there is a 
parallel between, on one hand, Mouffe’s understanding of the undecidability between 
liberalism and democracy and, on the other hand, the undecidability between freedom 
and control at the heart of the governmentality of the imperative to be vigilant. 
Our participants shuttled back and forth between antagonistic positions in which an 
appeal to the imperative to freedom (to dress and behave as one likes in public 
unfettered by control by the police, by the state, or by others) was counterpoised 
against an  
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internalized imperative to safeguard the self through modified dress and behavior. The 
former part of this antagonism may be understood as a liberal appeal to freedom on 
the basis of universalistic human rights and of equality of rights to the city. As Mouffe 
(2000) details, however, liberal democracy is characterized by a paradoxical tension 
between liberal and democratic traditions in which liberal rights claims based on an 
appeal to a universalistic humanity do not sit easily alongside the democratic 
sovereignty of “the people.” After all, who are “the people,” and how is citizenship to 
be decided? Mouffe suggests that the drawing up of the common ground for 
democratic debate requires a certain homogeneity of the demos, which, in turn, 
requires that the demos be constituted through acts of exclusion. It is to address this 
problem that Rawls (1996) theorizes an underlying liberal rationality that serves as the 
consensual ground rules for liberal-democratic politics—a rationality that is sustained 
through excluding those who question liberal tenets and through relegating many 
substantial “moral” differences to the private sphere, stripping them of their political 
status (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 25, 28). 
Here, Mouffe’s concerns about how certain tendencies within liberal-democratic 
thinking seek to delimit properly political concerns to the private sphere converge 
with Foucault’s (2008) concerns about the privatization of governmental questions. 
The dispositif of sexual vigilance can be understood as a mode of governmentality that 
puts into question women’s presence in public space in the city. As such, it depends 
upon a confining to the private sphere (although not to private space) all kinds of 
questions about women’s relationship to violence and women’s relationship to their 
own sexuality and to their own bodies. The consequences for a failure to abide by 
norms of appropriate femininity are often very public, but women’s decisions about 
how to dress or behave in public are produced within this dispositif as a privatized 
responsibility for managing “risks” under the rubric of “safety.” 
What feminist contestation—such as SlutWalk or Reclaim the Night marches—
does in this context is to open up the question of the demarcation of the boundaries of 
the polis and to put into a public political domain things that neoliberal governmental 
dispositifs of sexual vigilance tend to confine in the private domain. Here, Mouffe’s 
(2000) conception of agonism is useful in more than one sense. First, and crucial for 
our argument, it acknowledges the antagonisms between political positions and rather 
than seek an illusory rational consensus or reconciliation between them (pace 
Habermas and Rawls), seeks to engage this antagonism in productive becomings (see 
Connolly, 2004). Second, Mouffe’s concept of agonism allows for the demarcation of 
the limits of the demos—and what interests or subjects can be included therein—to 
come under scrutiny and challenge from time to time. It is suggestive, therefore, of 
how feminist activism seeks to place the dispositif of sexual vigilance into the sphere 
of public politics where it can be contested. Analytically, Mouffe’s understanding of 
agonism permits us to acknowledge the undecidability of the antagonisms faced by 
our participants and faced by responses to Meagher’s murder—the imperative to 
freedom versus the imperative to keep oneself safe—but also suggests the importance 
of how feminist activism places such antagonisms within a public political sphere 
wherein the very dispositif that produces these antagonisms can be contested. 
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Of course, it is not agonism itself that leads to a transformation of thought and 
action. Mouffe (2000) frames political processes in terms of given interests that are 
subject to reformulation only from time to time. It is an understanding that differs 
from a Foucaultian conception of how interests are products of the dispositifs that we 
might seek to question, a conception that implies that political struggle might do better 
to ignore given interests altogether, or at least to reformulate them. What it does do, 
though, is to enable an understanding of political antagonisms and the importance of 
placing them within a public sphere of political contestation. Thereafter, contesting 
the dispositif of sexual vigilance becomes a matter less of debate, and more of a 
“conversion” that entails a change of identity (Mouffe, 2000, p. 102) and of the 
relationship between power and knowledge. Here, there is some resonance between 
Mouffe’s (2000, p. 70) recourse to Wittgenstein’s understanding of the relationship 
between “truth” and common ways of life and Foucault’s understanding of regimes of 
truth (see Foucault, 2008, pp. 18-20). Crucially, contesting the imperative to be 
sexually vigilant might entail an untying of feminine sexual subjectivity from 
neoliberal self-governance and a reformulation of the very terms that pose the female 
body in public space as a problem in the first place. 
After Arseholes 
If the figure of the “arsehole” is offered as the antagonistic solution to explaining 
sexual violence against women in general, it is done so within a sociocultural setting 
where possible solutions to the problem of sexual violence must be reconciled within 
a democracy that values liberty, emancipation, self-actualization, and so on. It is the 
unsatisfactory offering that seeks to resolve the conundrum of how to live with rape 
culture. In this article, we have argued that the tension, outlined here, between being 
safe and being free composes a form of self-governance or auto-policing that is tied to 
an ethic of care for the self and of subjectification. We have argued that this form of 
subjectification operates through a dispositif of sexual vigilance. That is to say, the 
imperatives to be safe and to be free to occupy public space function in part through 
the normalization of specific femininities and the demonization of certain others. 
These imperatives are, we suggest, constructed in antagonistic tension with each 
other, highlighting the problem posed by, and to, the female body in public space. 
The response to the murder of Jill Meagher shows one example of the antagonism 
that we have interrogated, but as our research at SlutWalk demonstrates, the 
oscillation between freedom and the obligation to secure the self is a pervasive, deeply 
seated antagonism (Boutellier, 2004). Even where participants to whom we spoke 
were refuting victim-blaming discourses that accompany the imperative to stay safe, 
they remained fettered by an imperative to occupy space within certain prescriptions, 
those features becoming a constituent feature of appropriate femininity (Fanghanel, 
2015). What this suggests is that to undo the constitution of the female body in public 
space as a problem—and, moreover, to contest imperatives for sexual vigilance within 
a broader rape culture—it is not enough to appeal to freedom as if freedom is the 
opposite of control or of security. Sexual vigilance produces appropriate femininities  
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through making the antagonism between freedom and control the central object of the 
governmental relation of the self to the self. The usefulness of invoking the 
Foucaultian concept of the dispositif is that it shows that undoing imperatives of 
sexual vigilance requires the transformation of the conduct of conduct, the relation of 
the self to the self. Significantly, it shows that the struggle to transform the production 
of the female body and its relation to public space needs to contest the production of 
subjectivity, the techniques that set out appropriate modes of walking, gesturing, 
dressing, being in space, looking, and judging, and the knowledge of “femininity,” 
“danger,” “violence,” “risk,” “safety,” “propriety,” and so on. And, it shows that 
contesting the complex intertwining of the dispositif of sexual vigilance with the 
dispositif of security requires the refutation of how safety and appropriate femininity 
become privatized. 
It is here that we build on Mouffe’s (2000) theorization of agonism to suggest how 
the antagonism between freedom and safety relies upon a delimiting of the polis in 
which the questions women face about how to act in relation to appropriate—and 
“safe”—femininity are restricted to the private sphere. If Mouffe’s conceptualization 
speaks of the undecidability between freedom and the bounding of the polis at the 
heart of neoliberal politics, then her appeal to agonism is perhaps suggestive of how 
such antagonisms are important in the opening up of spaces of contestation and 
perhaps offers an approach for what to do with these antagonisms. An appeal to 
agonism as a mode of political contestation suggests that the antagonism between 
freedom and safety cannot be neatly resolved. Rather, it is to suggest that a space for 
struggle can be opened within which the dispositif that produces the antagonism in the 
first place—and all the accompanying modes of embodiment and knowledge—can be 
contested and decomposed. 
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Notes 
1. The Foucaultian term dispositif can be understood as any apparatus that has “the capacity 
to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, 
opinions, or discourses of living beings” (Agamben, 2006/2009, p. 14). 
2. Film available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiBck13rpcA 
3. The SlutWalk protest movement is a feminist anti-rape protest that takes place in cities 
around the world. We focussed on protests in 2011 and 2012. SlutWalks are still  
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4. happening—especially in the United States—but the number of marches is far smaller than 
in 2011. In a SlutWalk, women and men march to contest victim-blaming discourses such 
as those espoused by Toronto police officer Michael Sanguinetti, whose advice to women 
to “avoid dressing like sluts in order not to be victimized” (see Rush, 2011) prompted the 
SlutWalk protests. SlutWalks are so-called because participants are invited to dress “like 
sluts” (i.e., in ostensibly sexually provocative clothing) to draw attention, not only to the 
protest but also the falsity of the claim that there is a link between what women wear and 
the possibility of suffering a sexual assault. 
5. We would like to thank Ludovic Coupaye for initially suggesting this idea to us.  
6. The policeman in question is Michael Sanguinetti (see Note 1). 
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